Philosophy and Knowledge Research Phenomenology

Question: Discuss about the Philosophy and Knowledge Research Phenomenology. Answer: Introduction: Peter Godfrey-Smith has devised a number of philosophical theories through his publications and he is a distinguished professor of philosophy. He has well discussed the theories of scientific realism optimists and pessimists in his book Theory and reality: An introduction to the philosophy of science where the prime differences between the two aspects have been evidently outlined by him. He stated that the scientific realism optimists think that they can be confident about the fact that science is successful and in the process of continuous success of uncovering the world and its basic structure and can aptly describe the way it works (Godfrey-Smith 2009). On the contrary, the pessimists are comparatively more cautious and can even be a bit skeptical as they think that their feeble minds are not capable enough to reach the right theories and that too when the evidence are misleading. The pessimists are of the view that getting too confident too quickly ends up gathering inadequate or erroneous information. It is obvious that both the aspects of optimism and pessimism have their separate philosophical contents in their thoughts that are well reflected in their presentation of justification for theoretical entities. For example, the theoretical entities of caloric and phlogiston that are now no more in existence and previously posted are well supported by the pessimists whereas optimists support the previously questionable theoretical entities that now exist with evidence like genes, germs and atoms (Busseri 2013). Pessimists take a safer route in describing entities that are previously established whereas optimists look into the future and take chances to approve the questionable entities. The position held by the scientific realists has been strongly opposed by Thomas Kuhn with his theory of ladenness and incommensurability. Kuhn stated that the scientific realists conduct scientific research within a designated paradigm as the world is too complex and huge to be randomly explored. However, the scientific realists consider the deviants of the dominant paradigms as chasers of superstition and not as scientists. This position was strongly opposed by Kuhn as he considered science as cumulative that fills the gap of ignorance with knowledge. With his firm position, Kuhn argued that truth is invisible and cannot lead the scientists to better solving of the scientific puzzles (Franklin 2015). However, the scientific realists demonstrated science as a better instrument for solving and discovering puzzles for the better representation of the already existing nature. Kuhn, with his theory of ladenness and incommensurability, challenged the rationality of science with a lasting controversy. He opposed the notion of scientific realists by stating that the scientific theories are not adequate and capable enough to accurately describe the physical phenomena (Gupta 2015). This inability of science has been indicative of the fact that there is a tripartite division for the scientific history wherein, the fitting of the scientific realism between the two periods does not correspond to the theory of reality. Kuhn firmed his position by using the scientific analogy of Darwin and his theory of evolution by stating that solving puzzles is the driving force of science that opposed the faith of the scientific realists who believed that science is driven by truth. Traditionally, the independent reality of scientific phenomena is a form of scientific realism that has been opposed by the variety of antirealism that is known as instrumentalism by challenging the objectivity of knowledge that has been understood by the realists as objectivity. Instrumentalists did not believe that the scientists can reveal the real structure of the scientific phenomena and in turn, possessed a skeptical attitude for the genuineness of the scientific theories and their reality of the proposed entities (Mulkay 2014). However, with the rise of the scientific theories, scientific realism gained a new momentum where the defense of instrumentalism faced a hard time. This was well managed by the philosopher from Princeton named Bas van Fraassen with his theory of constructive empiricism where he claimed that although scientific realism holds a philosophical view of the theories of science, instrumentalism is also considered to be reasonable equally. Fraassen also claimed that the philosopher of science should be rational enough to accommodate both the theories of realism and instrumentalism (Faye 2016). To support the views of the scientific realists, the instrumentalists believe that the scientific theories are aimed at producing intellectual structures rather discovering the truth, for providing adequate predictions of what is observable. The realist semantics of Fraassen depicted that the aim of science is the adequacy of empiricism that recommends reconsidering of the epistemology of antirealism. Considering these facts, it can be stated that although the theoretical perspectives of scientific realists and instrumentalists are far completely opposing, constructive empiricism can serve to bring them together to make a reasonable sense of science from the viewpoint of a contemporary philosopher. In a nutshell, it can be said that realists are the group of philosophers who considers that the theories of science are aimed at describing the reality of the world as it exists as it is within the limits of the capability of the human epistemic access to the facts and reality. On the contrary, anti-realists are the group of philosophers who strive to aim the scientific theories at the empirical adequacy and not necessarily the truth. Considering the fundamentals of physics, it can be stated that the realists make the assumption that there is the existence of electrons however, the anti-realists believe that electrons are the basis of the theory based convenient construct for making sense of the types of data emerging out of fundamental physics, which is more practical (McCain 2016). Thus, many physicists work on the principles of quantum mechanics by favoring the pragmatic deployment of the associated theories for solving the computational problems which support the argument of God frey-Smith where the examples from physics support the anti-realist perspectives. Contrasting, the theory of molecular biology is lesser formalized in comparison to physics and therefore, it requires the lesser guidance by the theories (Delfino 2016). Since realism is committed to the existence of the world that is independent of the mind, molecular biology can be better fitted into the philosophical category of realism where it can be declared that it is less supportive to the anti-realist perspective. References Busseri, M.A., 2013. How dispositional optimists and pessimists evaluate their past, present and anticipated future life satisfaction: a lifespan approach.European Journal of Personality,27(2), pp.185-199. Delfino, R.A., 2016. Integrated Truth and Existential Phenomenology: A Thomistc Response to Iconic Anti-Realists in Science.The Review of Metaphysics,69(4), pp.832-835. Faye, J., 2016. Theory and Reality. InExperience and Beyond(pp. 95-157). Springer International Publishing. Franklin, A., 2015. The Theory-Ladenness of Experiment.Journal for General Philosophy of Science,46(1), pp.155-166. Godfrey-Smith, P., 2009.Theory and reality: An introduction to the philosophy of science. University of Chicago Press. Gupta, A., 2015. The Incommensurability Thesis: Has It Lost Its Bite?.Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research,32(1), pp.59-77. McCain, K., 2016. Anti-realism About Science. InThe Nature of Scientific Knowledge(pp. 219-234). Springer International Publishing. Mulkay, M., 2014.Science and the Sociology of Knowledge (RLE Social Theory). Routledge.